Abstract. The authenticated encryptions which resist misuse of initial value (or nonce) at some desired level of privacy are two-pass or Macthen-Encrypt constructions (inherently inefficient but provide full privacy) and online constructions, e.g., McOE, sponge-type authenticated encryptions (such as duplex, AEGIS) and COPA. Only the last one is almost parallelizable with some bottleneck in processing associated data. In this paper, we design a new online secure authenticated encryption, called ELmE or Encrypt-Linear mix-Encrypt, which is completely (twostage) parallel (even in associated data) and pipeline implementable. It also provides full privacy when associated data (which includes initial value) is not repeated. The basic idea of our construction and COPA are based on EME, an Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt type SPRP constructions (secure against chosen plaintext and ciphertext). Unlike EME, we consider online computable efficient linear mixing. Our construction optionally supports intermediate tags, which can be verified faster with less buffer size to provide security against block-wise adversaries which is meaningful in low-end device implementation.
Introduction
The common application of cryptography is to implement a secure channel between two or more users and then exchanging information over that channel. These users can initially set up their one-time shared key. Otherwise, a typical implementation first calls a key-exchange protocol for establishing a shared key or a session key (used only for the current session). Once the users have a shared key, either through the initial key set-up or key-exchange, they use this key to authenticate and encrypt the transmitted information using efficient symmetric-key algorithms such as a message authentication code Mac(·) and (symmetric-key) encryption Enc(·). The encryption provides privacy or confidentiality (hiding the sensitive data M , we call it plaintext or message) resulting a ciphertext C, whereas a message authentication code provides data-integrity (authenticating the transmitted message M or the ciphertext C) resulting a tag T . An authenticated encryption or AE is an integrated scheme which provides both privacy of plaintext and authenticity or data integrity of message or ciphertext. An authenticated encryption scheme F K takes associated data D (which may include initial value or nonce) and message M and produces tagged-ciphertext (C, T ). Its inverse F −1 K returns ⊥ for all those (D, C, T ) for which no such M exists, otherwise it returns M . Note that the associated data D must be sent along with tagged-ciphertext to decrypt correctly. In case of IV (or nonce) based authenticated encryption schemes [32, 5] , the IV must be distinct for every invocation of the tagged-encryption. Failure to do so, leads several critical attacks on the schemes. Usually, we apply a counter or we choose it randomly (then repetition can happen with negligible probability) to ensure distinct IV have been used in tagged-encryption. In this paper we do not need to have distinct IV and it still provides some amount of privacy, called online privacy.
Examples of Authenticated Encryptions
So far, cryptography community put a lot of effort of designing different authenticated encryptions. CAESAR [1] , a competition for Authenticated Encryption is going on, which will identify a portfolio of authenticated ciphers that offer advantages over AES-GCM and are suitable for widespread adoption. We have submitted a variant of our proposed construction ELmE in the competition and believe that it would be a strong candidate for this competition. Now, we quickly mention some of the popularly known competitive constructions putting into different categories based on construction types.
Encrypt-and-MAC and Encrypt-then-MAC. It relies on non-repeating IV (or nonce), e.g. CCM [16] , EAX [4] , GCM [36] , CHM [17] , CWC [22] , Sarkar's generic construction [35] and dedicated Stream Ciphers like Grain [15] , Helix [10] , Zuc [2] etc. All these constructions combine counter type encryption and a Mac.
MAC-then-Encrypt. It is a two-pass IV misuse resistant category e.g., SIV [34] , BTM [19] , HBS [18] . These compute a tag first and then based on this tag, counter type encryption is used to encrypt.
Online Feed Back Encryption. It uses feedback type encryption, e.g. IACBC [21] , XCBC [7] , CCFB [25] , McOE [11] , sponge-type constructions (Duplex [6] , AEGIS [29] etc). These constructions have a bottleneck that they are not fully parallelizable. Our construction ELmE and COPA [3] also fall in this category which use basic structure of completely parallel EME, Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt constructions [14] with linear mixing in the middle layer, and hence parallelizable.
Encrypt-then-Checksum. It uses IV-based block-wise encryption (non-repeating IV is required) and then finally checksum is used to compute tag. For example, different versions of OCB [5, 31, 23] and IAPM [21] .
Encrypt Mix Encrypt
Encrypt Mix Encrypt or EME [14] is a block-cipher mode of operation, that turns a block cipher into a tweakable enciphering scheme. The mode is parallelizable, and as serial-efficient as the non-parallelizable mode CMC [13] . EME algorithm entails two layers of ECB encryption and a non-linear mixing in between. In the non-linear mixing, the blockcipher is again used. EME is proved to provide SPRP [24] security in the standard, provable security model assuming that the underlying block cipher is SPRP secure. Moreover, the designers of EME showed a CCA-distinguisher if non-linear mixing is replaced by a binary linear mixing.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we have observed that replacing non-linear mixing by an efficient online linear mixing actually helps to have faster and parallel implementation of the construction and gives online prp [24] security. (We know that, an online function is a function whose i th block output is determined by the first i blocks of input) the Based on this observation, we have designed an online authenticated cipher ELmE based on Encrypt Mix Encrypt structure where the non-linear mixing is replaced by efficient online linear mix. ELmE has the following advantages over other popular authenticated schemes :
Nonce Misuse Resistant. Most of the IV based authenticated encryption schemes [32] like all the versions of OCB [5] , GCM [36] needed to ensure that nonce must be distinct for every invocation of the tagged-encryption. Failure to do so, leads easy attacks on the privacy of the scheme. In practice, it is challenging to ensure that the nonce is never reused. For example, in lightweight applications, it is quite challenging to generate distinct nonce as it either needs to store a non-tamperable state or require some hardware source of randomness. Apart from that, there are various issues like flawed implementations or bad management by the user, for example where users with same key uses the same nonce. Our construction ELmE does not have the distinct nonce requirement, instead it generates an IV from the associated data. In section 4, we prove that, ELmE provides online privacy under IV repeation and full privacy when distinct IVs are used.
Fully Pipeline Implementable. Most of the popular online constructions like McOE [11] (uses MHCBC [26] , later generalized and called TC3 [33] ) has a hardware bottleneck of not being fully pipelined (see the bottom layer of McOE in Figure 1 .1. It has CBC like structure, which is sequential and hence can not be pipelined). Our construction ELmE has a Encrypt-Linear mix-Decrypt type structure, making it fully parallel and pipeline implementable.
Efficient. Deterministic AE Schemes (for example : SIV, BTM, HBS) doesn't use any nonce. Instead it uses a derived IV using the message and the associated data, which ensures that it is distinct for each different associated data-message tuples but such constructions are two passed, and hence not efficient. Having Encrypt-Linear mix-Encrypt type layered design, makes our construction single pass and efficient.
Minimized Area in Combined Implementation. The construction of ELmE ensures that encryption and decryption behave almost in a similar fashion (see figure 3.1 and remark 2 in section 3). This helps us to implement both encryption and decryption in hardware with a smaller area. Nowadays in all application environment, both encryption and decryption of blockciphers to be implemented and hence we can share the architectures to have a compact combined hardware implementation of it.
Secure against Block-wise Adaptive Adversaries. Due to limited memory in some environment such as low end devices the decryption oracle has to release a part of the plaintext before it authenticates. That raises some attacks on popular constructions [20] . We consider similar advantages such as privacy and authenticity, however the adversaries (called blockwise adaptive adversary) would have access of partial decryption oracles for authenticity security. To resist such attacks, intermediate tags can be used. In section 5, we have shown that ELmE can be extended to incorporates intermediate tags, hence it provides security against Block-wise adaptive adversaries.
Preliminaries
Definitions and Notation. By convention, B = {0, 1} n where n is the block size of the underlying blockcipher. An -tuple x ∈ B is denoted by (
Let us fix q message and associate data pairs
We denote (P 1 , . . . , P q ) by τ in . We assume that all P i 's are distinct and in case D i contains distinct initial value, we call it nonce-respecting. A tagged ciphertext
Full and Online Privacy
We give a particularly strong definition of privacy, one asserting indistinguishability from random strings. Consider an adversary A who has access of one of two types of oracles: a "real" encryption oracle or an "ideal" authenticated encryption oracle. A real authenticated encryption oracle, F K , takes as input (D, M ) and returns (C, T ) = F K (D, M ). Whereas an ideal authenticated encryption oracle $ returns a random string R with R = M + 1 for every fresh pair (D, M ). Given an adversary A (w.o.l.g. throughout the paper we assume a deterministic adversary) and an authenticated encryption scheme F , we define the (full) privacy-advantage of A by the distinguishing advantage of A distinguishing F from $. More formally,
We include initial value IV as a part of associated data D and so for noncerespecting adversary A (never repeats a nonce or initial value and hence the view obtained by the adversary is nonce-respecting) the response of ideal oracle for every query is random as all queries are fresh. Similarly, we define online privacy for which the the ideal online authenticated encryption oracle $ ol responses random string keeping the online property. The online privacy advantage of an adversary A against F is defined as Adv
F (A). View and A-realizable. We define view of a deterministic adversary A interacting with an oracle O by a tuple τ (A O ) := (Q 1 , R 1 , . . . , Q q , R q ) where Q i is the i th query and R i is the response by O. It is also called O-view. A tuple τ = (Q 1 , R 1 , . . . , Q q , R q ) is called A-realizable if it makes query Q i after obtaining all previous responses R 1 , . . . , R i−1 . As A is assumed to be deterministic, given R 1 , . . . , R q , there is an unique q-tuple Q 1 , . . . , Q q for which the combined tuple is A-realizable. Now we describe the popular coefficient H-technique which can be used to bound distinguish advantage. Suppose f and g are two oracles and V denotes all possible A-realizable views while A interacts with f or g (they have same input and output space).
We skip the proof as it can be found in many papers, e.g. [28] .
Authenticity
We say that an adversary A forges an authenticated encryption F if A outputs (D, C, T ) where F K (D, C, T ) = ⊥ (i.e. it accepts and returns a plaintext), and A made no earlier query (D, M ) for which the F -response is (C, T ). It can make s attempts to forge after makingueries. We define that A forges if it makes at least one forges in all s attempts and the authenticity-advantage of A by
Suppose for any valid tuple of associate data and tagged ciphertext (D, C, T ), the tag T can be computed from (D, C). We write T = T K (D, C). So (D, C, T ) is a valid tagged ciphertext if and only if T K (D, C) = T . Almost all known authenticated encryptions F (including those following encrypt-then-mac paradigm) have this property for a suitably defined ciphertext C and tag function T . We know that PRF implies Mac. We use similar concept to bound authenticity. More formally, for any forgery B, there is a distinguisher A such that
where O and $ are independent oracles and $ is a random function. This can be easily seen by defining A as follows: -A first makes the q many F -queries (D i , M i ) which are made by B and obtains responses (C i , T i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q.
-Then it makes s many T -queries (D j , C j ), q < j ≤ q + s where (D j , C j , T j )'s are returned by B.
-A returns 1 (interpreting that interacting with real) if and only if T (D j , C j ) = T j for some j. The distinguishing advantage of A is clearly at least Pr[B forges] − s 2 n and hence our claim follows.
Trivial Queries. As F (D, M ) = (C, T ) implies that T (D, C) = T , we call such T -query (D, C) trivial (after obtaining response (C, T ) response of the Fquery (D, M )). The repetition of queries are also called trivial. Without loss of generality, we assume that all adversaries A is deterministic and does not make any trivial query. This assumptions are useful to simplify the analysis.
ELmE: An Online Authenticated Encryption Algorithm
In this section, we demonstrate our new construction ELmE. It is an online authenticated encryption which takes an associated data D ∈ B d and a messages M ∈ B e and returns a tagged-ciphertext C ∈ B e+1 for all integers d ≥ 1, e ≥ 1. In the algorithm given below, we assume associated data to be non-empty. The case when the associated data is empty, is separately taken care in the remark 1. To process incomplete blocks, one can either apply an injective padding rule (e.g., first pad 1 and then a sequence of zeros to make the padded message or associate data size multiple of n) or some standard methods (e.g., ciphertext stealing [8] , the method used in Hash Counter Hash type constructions [9] , XLS [30] etc.). It uses Encrypt-Mix-Encrypt type construction with a specified simple linear mixing (see in Algorithm 1) and a keyed block cipher E k : B → B for the ECB layers. The ECB layers are masked by separate keys L 1 (for associated data), L 2 (for the message) and L 3 (for the ciphertext) chosen uniformly from B.
and can be preprocessed. Thus, for notational simplicity and simplifying security analysis, we demonstrate our constructions for complete block messages and with three independent keys L 1 , L 2 and L 3 . The complete construction is described below in Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Fig. 3 below. 
will produce C 2 [1] = 0 with probability 1. Note that, Algorithm 1 is defined for non-empty associated data. One can ensure associated data to be non-empty by including a non-empty public message number, in the first block of the associated data. Still, if we want to incorporate empty associated data in our algorithm, we make a small modification and initialize the value W [0] to 1, to resist against any attack. The rest computations, to generate the tagged ciphertext, are identical to the above algorithm.
Underlying Layered Construction :
In this section we view the construction in a modular way which actually helps in understanding the design rational of our construction. Moreover, it also helps to understand the security analysis we will make later. Let mix be an online linear function, described below. We construct an online permutation based on the mix, a permutation π : B → B and masking functions g j : N × B → B, j = 1, 2, 3, such
Return (y, w)
Algorithm 1: ELmE Authenticated Encryption Algorithm. Here α is a primitive element of the binary field (GF (2 n ), +, .).
is a permutation (we denote the inverse by g −1
Let α is a primitive element of the field and
and L 3 = E K (2) (here we assume for simplicity that L i 's are uniform and independent to the underlying blockcipher).
• Layer-1:
mix Function : The mix function, we use is following :
where B 1 is a ((e + 1) × d) full matrix and B 2 is a ((e + 1) × (e + 1)) lower triangular invertible matrix. In particular, we choose a mix function as defined below for 1 ≤ i ≤ e + 1. When d = 0 :
When d = 0 :
Design Rationale
The main goal of the cipher is to be efficient, provide high performance and able to perform well in low end devices. For efficiency, we want our the cipher to be one pass, nonce misuse resistant. To obtain high performance, we want our cipher efficient as well as fully pipeline implementable. To perform well in low end devices, we require that our cipher to be secure against blockwise adaptive adversaries.
We know that, Encrypt Mix Encrypt or EME [14] is a block-cipher mode of operation, that turns a block cipher into a tweakable enciphering scheme. The mode is parallelizable, but as serial-efficient as the non-parallelizable mode CMC [13] . EME algorithm entails two layers of ECB encryption and a non-linear mixing in between. In the non-linear mixing, the blockcipher is again used. EME is proved to provide sprp [24] security in the standard, provable security model assuming that the underling block cipher is sprp secure. We observed that replacing non-linear mixing by an efficient online linear mixing actually helps to have faster and parallel implementation of the construction and gives online prp [24] security, which is good enough to construct an authenticated encryption scheme, if tags are properly generated.
We use online linear mixing to make the construction online and efficiently implemented in low end device or any platform with limited memory. Moreover, we choose ρ as our online linear mixing, as it is lightweight, efficiently computable and at the same time, intermediate tags can be incorporated very efficiently (descried in details in section 5). Note that, we could have used more lightweight mixing like simple xor operation in the linear mixing, but then generating intermediate tags wouldn't have been efficient.
We replace the second layer encryption by decryption which makes authenticated encryption and verified decryption almost identical. This helps us to minimize the combined implementd area when both encryption and decryption is implemented in the same device. Nowadays in all application environment, both encryption and decryption of blockciphers are needed to be implemented and hence we can share the architectures to have a compact combined hardware implementation of it.
Security of ELmE Authenticated Encryption

Privacy of ELmE
In this subsection, we prove online privacy of ELmE. Thus it provides full privacy against all nonce-respecting adversaries. Let A be an adversary which makesueries (D i , M i ) and obtains responses (
(the total number of blocks in queries in addition with the checksum block). Let us fix an adversary A. Let $ perm denotes the random n-bit permutation and η priv := max B Adv
(B) denotes the maximum advantage over all adversaries B making at most σ priv queries and running in time T 0 which is about time of the adversary A plus some overhead which can be determined from the hybrid technique.
Proof. The second part of the theorem is the standard hybrid argument. The first part follows directly from the coefficient H technique (see Lemma 1) and following Propositions 1 and 2. For this, we first need to define a set of good views V good which would be applied in the proposition. Let us fix q message and associate data pairs
and σ = i i . We denote (P 1 , . . . , P q ) by τ in . We assume that all P i 's are distinct.
Definition 1 (Good views).
A tagged ciphertext tuple τ out = (C 1 , . . . , C q ) (also the complete view τ = (τ in , τ out )) is called good online view (belongs to τ good ) w.r.t. τ in if (τ in , τ out ) is an online view (i.e., it must be realized by an online cipher, see section 2) and the following conditions hold:
The first condition says that we can have collision of ciphertext blocks in a position only if they are ciphertexts of two messages with same prefixes up to that block. The second conditions says that all tag blocks are fresh as if these are independently generated. The following result says that in case of ideal online cipher, generating a bad view (i.e. not a god view) has negligible probability.
Proposition 1 (Obtaining a Good view has high probability).
2 n . Proof. According to the definition, an online view is not a good view if ∃i, j, i , j pairs are there, the probability that
2 n . We now fix a good view τ = (τ in , τ out ) as mentioned above. The tagged ciphertext of P i is given by C i which has e i + 1 blocks where the last block T i := C i [e i + 1] denotes the tag. In the following result, we compute the interpolation probability, i.e.
Proposition 2 (High interpolation probability of ELmE). ∀τ ∈ V good ,
−nP where P denotes the number of non-empty prefixes of (D i , M i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q as for every different prefixes, $ ol assigns an independent and uniform ciphertext blocks.
Remark 2. If associated datas are distinct for all the q messages, then P = σ priv and hence, we'll have full privacy i.e. the construction becomes indistinguishable from a random cipher with same domain and range.
Remark 3. If we define L 1 , L 2 and L 3 from E K then we need to revise the proof of the Proposition 2 to obtain a modified in Proposition 2. The revision is mainly by defining more internal bad events that some of the Π inputs is 0,1 or 2 (the inputs are used to generate L-values). As this adds notational complexity and does not increase the order of advantage (except the constant factor will increase) we skip it for clarity throughout the paper.
Proof of Proposition 2.
As adversary is deterministic, we restrict to those good views which can be obtained by A. Hence the probability
Before computing interpolation probability we denote all intermediate variables
Let for all i and j whenever defined
Note that CC and T T have been defined through tagged-ciphertext and L 3 instead of applying Π on Y blocks. Let DD = (DD 1 , . . . , DD q ) and similarly we define MM, Z, X, Y and CC. So, we have mix(Z, X) = Y with the extended definition of mix which applies mix function for each (Z i , X i ).
Collision Relation. Now we define a collision relation of a vector (x 1 , . . . , x t ) by the equivalence relation coll(x) for which i is related to j if and only if 
Proof. We prove it by using union bound applied to all equality (which violates that (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ) is valid). Because of primitiveness of α and uniform independent choice of L 1 , L 2 and L 3 each equality violating valid has probability 2 −n . As there are at most 
if and only if i and j are related in γ 2 . Clearly, given any γ 1 and L there is exactly one γ 2 for which (γ 1 , γ 2 ) is consistent with L. We write γ 1 ⇒ L γ 2 . Example 1. If γ 1 = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4, 6}, {5}} for r 1 = 6, then we write X γ 1 = (X 1 , X 2 , X 1 , X 4 , X 5 , X 4 ). Let L map into three variables (i.e., r 2 = 3 such that
and L 2 (X γ 1 ) = X 5 (we work it here in binary field). So γ 1 ⇒ L γ 2 where γ 2 = {{1, 3}, {2}}.
Lemma 3. [Number of Solutions for Consistent relations] Let
where s 1 and s 2 denote the number of equivalence classes of γ 1 and γ 2 respectively and s = s 1 + s 2 .
Proof. Let Y = L(X)
. All other pairs are unrelated. Let γ 2 be the a collision relation defined on the set {(i, j, C) : i ≤ q, j ≤ l i + 1} for which only pairs
. Let the no. of equivalence class of γ i be s i , i = 1, 2. Note that s 2 = P , the number of prefixes of (D i , M i ) containing at least one message block. X 1 ) , . . . , Y q := mix(Z q .X q )). Since the view is good,
. Now for any other pair ((i, j), (i , j )), it is easy to see that mix function leads to a non-trivial equation mix j (X
So by multiplying the probability for validness of (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ) the proof of the proposition completes.
Authenticity of ELmE
In this subsection, we prove online privacy of ELmE. Thus it provides full privacy against all nonce-respecting adversaries. Let A be an adversary which makesueries (D i , M i ) and obtains responses (C i , T i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q and attempts to forge s times with the ciphertext queries ( (B) denotes the maximum advantage over all adversaries B making at most σ auth queries and running in time T 0 which is about time of the adversary A plus some overhead which can be determined from the hybrid technique.
be the triple of masking keys and Π be the uniform random permutation. For notational simplicity, we write ELmE Π,L by F . Note that for a valid tuple of associate data and tagged ciphertext (D, C, T ), the tag T can be computed from C and the key. We write
So (D, C, T ) is a valid tagged ciphertext if and only if T (D, C) = T . As we have observed in
Eq. 1, we only need to show indistinguishability for which we apply the coefficient H technique again. For this, we need to identify set of good views for which we have high interpolation probability.
Good View. A (F, T )-view of a distinguisher
A is the pair v = (τ F , τ T ) where
is an q-tuple of F -online view and τ F = (D j , C j , T j ) q<j≤q+s is an s-tuple non-trivial T -view. It is called good if τ F is good (as defined in Definition 1) and for all q < j ≤ q + s, T j 's are fresh -distinct and different from all other T i 's and C i [j]'s. We recall the notation |M i | = e i , |D i | = d i and
Since F is online function we consider pair of independent oracles ($ ol , $) where $ ol denotes the random online function and $ is simply a random function.
Proposition 3 (Realizing good view while interacting with random function has high probability). For all adversary A,
As in Proposition 1, we can similarly prove the above. The first summand takes care the collisions in C i [j]'s (i.e., the bad view for τ F as in Proposition 1) and the second summand takes care the collision between T i 's (q < i ≤ q + s) and all other C i [j]'s. Now we fix a good view τ = (τ F , τ T ) as defined above (following same notations). Now it is easy to see that obtaining τ interacting with ($ ol , $) has probability 2 −ns × 2 −nσ pf = 2 −n(s+σ pf ) where σ pf denotes the number of non-empty prefixes of (C i , T i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q (at those blocks random online function returns randomly).
Proposition 4 (Good view has high interpolation probability). For any good (F, T )-view τ and = 7σ
2 auth /2 n , we have
Assuming the proposition, the pair (F, T ) is -indistinguishable from ($ ol , $) with = + 2σ 2 auth 2 n , the result follows. The proof of the proposition is given below.
Proof of Proposition 4. We choose X 1 , . . . , X q and then Y q+1 , . . . , Y s+q which fix all internal X and Y values except the last block for the s many T -queries. We explicitly provide counting steps by steps. We choose valid L which fixes M M 's for the first q messages and, CC's and DD's for all s +ueries. We can then choose M M for these s queries so that checksums are all fresh and for all these fresh checksums we can ensure last Y blocks fresh by choosing X blocks appropriately. Now we make these choices one by one more formally :
is called valid w.r.t. the fixed good (F, T )-view τ if the computed M M , DD, CC and T T values satisfy the collision relations described below and whenever C j , j > q, is a strictly prefix of C i , i ≤ q and
To define the collision (equivalence) relation, we mention those places where equivalence occurs. In all other places these are not related.
where S represents any one of the four symbols M, D, C and T . So they can be identical only if their positions as well as symbols (or types of the input) match. The simple counting argument with union bound applied to all individual bad events proves the following result.
(ii) Choices of valid Z, X, Y except the last blocks for the last s queries. As in section 4, τ F induces consistent collision relations of (Z, X) := (Z 1 , . . ., Z q , X 1 , . . . , X q ) and Y := (Y 1 , . . . , Y q ). Now we extend this collision relation to (Z q+1 , Y q+1 , . . . , Z q+s , Y q+s ) as follows for j < i ≤ q + s:
The collision relation on (Z, Y) induces a collision relation on X f := (X q+1 , . . ., X q+s ) through the linear mix −1 function. That is, (Z, Y) ⇒ mix −1 X f . Let γ 1 be the extended collision relation on (Z, X) and γ 2 be that of Y . We denote the number of equivalence classes by s 1 and s 2 . By using the counting on consistency relations (see Lemma 3) the number of (Z, X, Y ) with mix(Z, X) = Y and coll(Z, X) = γ 1 , coll(Y ) = γ 2 is at least
where s 3 denotes the number of additional equivalence classes in Y f which are not present in (Y 1 , . . . , Y q ). Thus, s is the number of blocks we can choose freely which determines all other blocks. Now we state an important property of these collision relations γ 1 and γ 2 .
for some i ≤ q. This means the message corresponding to a forged ciphertext is the prefix of some other messages, queried previously by the adversary.
Proof. Let us fix j = q + 1 (for all other j, the argument is similar) and denote j by . Now we have the following identities:
would get completely new variable which is not present in all firstueries. Now if we write X q+1 [j] in terms of these X t j 's variable one can obtain the desired result. Armed with all these counting, the interpolation probability is at least
This completes the proof.
Our Construction incorporating Intermediate Tags
Suppose, we want ELmE with intermediate tags generated after each it blocks. In this case, for a message M ∈ B e , ELmE generates a ciphertext C ∈ B e and T ∈ B h where h = .L 3 . ∀ j < e s.t. k|j, the intermediate tags are generated by T [ 
Int Tag
Fig. 5.1. ELmE with intermediate tags
Intermediate tags can be used in authenticated encryption to provide quick rejection of invalid decryption queries. This also helps in low-end implementation where the message has to be released depending on buffer size. If we have an intermediate tag in appropriate positions so that we can reject before we release some message blocks. Our construction can be easily extended to produce intermediate tags also, as described in the figure below. Here, we have used intermediate tags after processing of each k < n blocks of message. 
(the total number of ciphertext blocks with the tag blocks). The online Privacy of F is given by:
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, we fix q message and associate data pairs
We modify the definition of Good views as follows :
is an online view if the following conditions hold:
It is easy to see that, obtaining such a Good view has high probability :
We now fix a good view τ = (τ in , τ out ) as mentioned above, where the tagged ciphertext of P i is given by (C i , T i ) which has (e i + h i ) blocks where T i [j] denotes the j th intermediate tag of the message i and T i [h i ] denotes the final tag of message i. We set up the notations of DD, MM, Z, X, Y as defined in the proof of . We redefine CC, TT and define H as follows :
It is easy to check that,
The proof is exactly similar to the proof of Lemma 2 Now we look at the collision relations γ 1 and γ 2 . We modify the collision relation γ 2 s.t. it is defined on the set {(i, j, C) :
All other pairs are unrelated. Let the no. of equivalence class of γ 2 becomes s 2 .
For any other pairs,
, leads to the nontrivial equation :
where
is a non-trivial equation. This proves that, the collision relations defined as above is consistent with mix. Now, applying Lemma 3, we have the result
So by multiplying the probability for validness of (L 1 , L 2 , L 3 ) we obtain the High interpolation probability of F :
Now applying Patarin's H-coefficient techinique, the result follows.
Attack against the Authenticity of the construction when k ≥ n
Here is an demo example of how the construction works when n = 4. We have shown it for k ≥ 4 with a degree 4 primitive polynomial x 4 +x 3 +1. For simplicity we take empty associated data. The attack is described below. The associated data part is considered as null for all the queries however the attack works for any fixed associated data.
This follows from the following equality for the input of the blockcipher invocation which computes the intermediate tag:
Main Idea: Suppose the forged ciphertext is [5] . To make this equation trivial with
, we make j th blocks of all the messages i 1 , · · · , i 5 , i to be same for all j ≥ 2. Using the fact that α is a root of the primitive polynomial of degree 4, we will assign [1] such that (assigning all the values to one particular is not allowed) regardless of the exact values of the two, the following equation become trivial :
we obtain that. It is easy to see that the equality of the X values ensures that, i 5 = i 1 and i 4 = i 3 = i 2 = i. Hence, we have just two queries. This idea can be similarly extended to have an attack against the construction when k ≥ n using the primitive polynomial of degree n.
Authenticity of the construction F with k < n
Let A be an adversary which makesueries (D i , M i ) and obtains responses (C i , T i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q and then tries to forge s queries (
and σ auth = q+s i=1 ( i + h i ) (the total number of ciphertext blocks with the tag blocks). The forging advantage of A is given by:
is an q-tuple of F -online view and τ T = (D j , C j , T j ) q<j≤q+s is an s-tuple non-trivial T -view. Note, there are two types of forging queriessome with intermediate tag forging and others that forges the final tag (in case forging query's length is less than t or the length is long but upto last generated intermediate tag, the ciphertext is a prefix of some previous queried message). 
Since F is online function we consider pair of independent oracles ($ ol , $) where $ ol denotes the random online function and $ is simply a random function. It is easy to see from the previous proof that, Proposition 5 (Realizing good view while interacting with random function has high probability). For all adversary A,
Now we fix a good view τ = (τ F , τ T ) as defined above (following same notations). Now it is easy to see that obtaining τ interacting with ($ ol , $) has probability 2 −ns ×2 −nσ pf = 2 −n(s+σ pf ) where σ pf denotes the number of non-empty prefixes of (C i , T i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ q (at those blocks random online function returns randomly).
Proposition 6 (Good view has high interpolation probability). For any good (F, T )-view τ and = 8σ 2 auth /2 n , we have
Assuming this proposition, the pair (F, T ) is -indistinguishable from ($ ol , $) with = + 2σ 2 auth 2 n . Hence the theorem is proved using equation 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. We choose X 1 , . . . , X q and then Y q+1 , . . . , Y s+q which fix all internal X and Y values except the last block for the s many T -queries. We explicitly provide counting steps by steps. We choose valid L which fixes M M 's for the first q messages and, CC's and DD's for all s +ueries. We can then choose M M for these s queries so that checksums are all fresh and for all these fresh checksums we can ensure last Y blocks fresh by choosing X blocks appropriately. Now we make these choices one by one more formally :
. . α e i ) = 0. To define the collision (equivalence) relation, we mention those places where equivalence occurs. In all other places these are not related.
(ii) Choices of valid Z, X, Y, H except the last blocks of the q t queries. As in section 4, τ F induces consistent collision relations of (Z, X) := (Z 1 , . . ., Z q , X 1 , . . . , X q ) and Y := (Y 1 , . . . , Y q ). Now we extend this collision relation to (Z q+1 , Y q+1 , . . . , Z q+s , Y q+s ) as follows for j < i ≤ q + s:
2 auth 2 n ) where s 3 denotes the number of additional equivalence classes in Y f which are not present in (Y 1 , . . . , Y q ). Thus, s is the number of blocks we can choose freely which determines all other blocks. Now we state an important property of these collision relations γ 1 and γ 2 .
would get completely new variable which is not present in all firstueries. For the first q t forging queries, if we write X q+1 [j] in terms of these X t j 's variable one can obtain the desired result and for the last q it forging queries it follows from Lemma 9. (iv) Choices of last block of X for these q t queries For any such previous choices, we choose the blocks of X j [e j + 1], q < j ≤ q + q t , so that the last block of Y j 's are fresh. This can be chosen in 2
(v) Choices of last block of X for these q it queries For this, we similarly choose the blocks of X j [e j + 1], q + q t < j < q + s so that the last block of Armed with all these counting, the interpolation probability is at least
This completes the proof. Proof. First we consider the case where c = 1. Then will generalize for any c. One can check that, if any of the blocks in the forged ciphertext is not identical to a previous response, then T i [1] will not be valid due to the randomness of Y value corresponding to that block. Similarly taking T i [1] as some final tag output will give some non-trivial equations. Hence, assume the forged Ciphertext be 
, otherwise we have an polynomial of α with degree ≤ k − j < n, whose value is 0, which contradicts the primitivity of α in GF (2 n ). Now, we have to consider the equalities in the Z blocks. Let d z denotes the no. of associated data blocks in the message M z . There are two cases :
In this case, we has the following equalities in the Z blocks :
, otherwise again we have an polynomial of α with degree ≤ k − j < n, whose value would be 0. Hence, the forged ciphertext is a prefix of the ciphertext corresponding to the i th message. Note that, assigning k ≥ n, vialotes this claim. [1] to be valid, the equality in the block Z[d max ], violates the primitivity of α. Note, that as for some message, there is no contribution to this block, assigning same value in this block for the remaining messages also gives a polynomial of α, with degree less than n, whose value is 0. So, this case doesn't occur. 
. If the ciphertext is valid, we have the following set of equalities for all ck < j ≤ (c + 1)k,
which is again violating the primitivity of α unless ∀ck < j ≤ c(k+1),
. Hence the forge ciphertext is identical with the ciphertext of i th query.
Efficient Intermediate tag Generation : Comparison with COPA
Intermediate tags are used to provide block-wise security. Suppose we consider a construction with intermediate tag size of k blocks. At each k blocks, we check the intermediate tag, hold the k block message and finally release the k blocks of the message if the tag is verified. For that, we need to store all the intermediate computations and the already computed messages in order to perform the verification. As we are using low end device, we need to minimize the buffer size. Now, generating intermediate tags for COPA is not as straight forward as ELmE as similar approach won't provide any security because identical last two blocks will produce same intermediate tag.
Moreover, we claim that even if intermediate tags is produced for COPA as if the final tag, then it also has the disadvantage of requiring additional buffer storage. Now we compare the 20 round pipeline implementations which is keeping computing the messages even after intermediate tag to keep the pipeline full. We save 10 blocks in buffer mainly due to faster verification (ELmE verifies after one layer, whereas COPA verifies after two layers). It has great advantage for low-end devices (keeping in mind that, block-wise adversaries are considered only when buffer size is limited implying low-end device).
Keeping the above benefits into consideration, we opt for the linear mix ρ function rather than using a simple xor operation, as used in COPA. 
Provision for Skipping Intermediate Tags during Decryption
Discussion on Performances and Future Work
We mainly provide theoretical comparisons of OCB3, McOE-D, COPA and our construction ELmE. All the constructions have same key size and similar number of random mask (which can be preprocessed) for masking layers. The number of blockcipher calls for processing every message, associate data and tag blocks are given in the execution. Due to the sequential nature of the lower level of McOE-D, the speed up factor can be at most 2. Now, we briefly discuss bottlenecks issues of the other constructions. COPA has bottleneck in associated data and hence it requires additional waiting for obtaining intermediate values from associated data. M cOE uses T C3 type encryption and it's lower level has a CBC type structure which can not be executed in parallel implying the construction can not be pipelined. Hence it has a hardware bottleneck. OCB3 (which has minimum bottleneck among all versions) also has a bottleneck in the nonce processing. As the encryption of the IV is needed in the masking of the messages, hence the encryption of the messages can start only after the encryption of IV , hence has the bottleneck of having additional clock cycles required for one block encryption. Our construction is completely parallel with no such bottleneck as described above. Moreover the construction treats the additional data and message exactly in a similar way (except with different masking keys). The encryption and decryption also behave similarly and hence ensures less chip area in hardware implementation. Moreover our construction can incorporate intermediate tags (with intermediate tag length less than or equal to 128), which provides quick rejection of invalid decryption queries ensuring the construction's security even against block-wise adaptive adversaries.
Note that, the above comparison is given from theoretical point of view. Experimental measurements to support these claim is a possible future scope. We've planned to implement a portable reference software implementation of our cipher as well as include a reference hardware design in verilog.
